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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Dorothy Marx guilty of felony driving under the influence of alcohol and
the district court sentenced her to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. The district court eventually placed Ms. Marx on probation and ordered that her
driving privileges be absolutely suspended for five years, in violation of Idaho Code § 188005( 6)( d), which authorizes a court to impose a five-year license suspension, but only the first
year can be an absolute suspension. Ms. Marx argues on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion by acting outside the boundaries of its legal authority, when it imposed a five-year
absolute driving suspension. (See generally, Appellant's Brie£)
In response, the State acknowledges that a five-year absolute driver's license suspension
is not authorized under LC. § 18-8005(6)(d), but argues the issue is either not ripe for appellate
consideration, or that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the statute allows
Ms. Marx to request restricted driving privileges after one year, in spite of the plain language of
the district court's order to the contrary.

The State's arguments are based upon a

misunderstanding ofboth the law and the facts and are without merit.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Marx's Appellant's Brief. They are repeated in this Reply Brief only where necessary to
address the State's arguments.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by acting outside the boundaries of its legal authority,
when it imposed upon Ms. Marx a five-year absolute suspension of her driving privileges?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Acting Outside The Boundaries Of Its Legal
Authority, When It Imposed Upon Ms. Marx A Five-Year Absolute Suspension Of Her Driving
Privileges
Ms. Marx was convicted of felony DUI because she was found guilty of driving under the
influence and she had a prior felony DUI conviction within the previous 15 years.
(R. 46206, pp.312-27; see also I.C. §§ 18-8004(1)(a), 18-8005(9).) As such, Ms. Marx was
subject to the penalty provisions found in I.C. § 18-8005(6). See I.C. § 18-8005(9). Idaho
Code § 18-8005( 6)( d) requires the district court to order an absolute license suspicion for a
period of one year, but provides the district court with the discretion to impose an additional
four-year suspension.
The district court exceeded the authority granted to it through LC. § 18-8005(6)(d) by
including the following provision in its order placing Ms. Marx on probation:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's driver's license or permit
is suspended for a period offive (5) years during which time Defendant will have
absolutely no driving privileges, to commence on the date of the Defendant's
release from incarceration, or upon conclusion of any other current driver's
license suspension. However, after the completion of the five year absolute no
driving suspension, the Defendant may drive a motor vehicle only if it is properly
licensed, insured and equipped with a functioning interlock device during her
term of probation. If the defendant is allowed to drive, no minors under the age of
18, will be allowed to be in the vehicle.
(R., p.27 (emphasis added).)

Thus, the district court acted outside the bounds of its legal

authority when it ordered a five-year absolute driving suspension, rather than a five-year
suspension, with only the first year being an absolute suspension, as authorized by Idaho law.
Despite acknowledging both the language in the district court's order, and the limitation
placed on the district court's discretion by LC. § 18-8005(6)(d), the State asserts that the issue
Ms. Marx raises on appeal is not ripe. (Respondent's Brief, pp.1-6.) The State is incorrect.
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"The ripeness doctrine concerns the timing of a suit and asks whether a case is brought too early.
The purpose of the ripeness requirement is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in
purely abstract disagreements." State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342 (2005) (citing Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).) Ms. Marx is not bringing a legal action too early-

her appeal stems from a legal action that was already brought against her. And she is not asking
this Court to prevent a theoretical future imposition of a five-year absolute suspension - she is
asking this Court to review the five-year absolute suspension the district court has already
imposed. The issue Ms. Marx raises is thus ripe for review.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court uses a three-part test to determine ripeness in
Idaho: "[A] party must show (1) the case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and
substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present need
for adjudication." Id. (citations omitted). The State does not argue that this appeal fails to
present definite and concrete issues, nor does it argue that there are no real and substantial
controversies, but instead theorizes that there is no present need for adjudication because
LC.§ 18-8005(6)(d) allows Ms. Marx to petition the district court for restricted privileges after
one year. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) But the district court has already ordered that Ms. Marx
may not petition the court for restricted privileges by imposing an "absolute" five-year license

suspension, in spite of the requirements of LC. § 18-8005(6)(d). The district court's order is not
a theoretical suggestion that it may not grant Ms. Marx restricted privileges if she makes such a
request after one year - it is legal ruling stating that Ms. Marx's driving privileges are absolutely
suspended for five years. The district court's failure to abide by the limitations placed on its
discretion by the legislature through LC. § 18-8005(6)(d), coupled with Ms. Marx's timely notice
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of appeal, is the very reason this issue is ripe for appellate review. The State's ripeness argument
is without merit.
Alternatively, the State argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing a five-year absolute suspension, theorizing that the district court did not actually
impose a five-year absolute suspension. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) The State notes that the
original judgment of conviction and order retaining jurisdiction, includes a provision stating that
Ms. Marx's "driver's license or permit is suspended for a period of five (5) years, pursuant to
I.C. § 18-8005, during which time Defendant will have absolutely no driving privileges,"
(Respondent's Brief, p.7 (citing R. 46206, p.360).) The State also notes that the judge who
initially imposed Ms. Marx's sentence and retained jurisdiction, indicated that Ms. Marx could
ask for a "restricted license at some point." (Respondent's Brief, p.7 (citation omitted).) The
State appears to argue that the sentencing court's citation to LC. § 18-8005 in its order, in
conjunction with that court's statements indicating that Ms. Marx could apply for restricted
privileges at some point, means that the district court did not impose a five-year absolute
suspension. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.)
This appeal, however, does not stem for the original imposition of Ms. Marx's sentence
and order retaining jurisdiction, but rather stems from the later order placing her on probation.
(R., pp.34-37.) The State mistakenly asserts that the judge who placed Ms. Marx on probation
used the same language in her order that the judge who imposed Ms. Marx's sentence and
retained jurisdiction used in his order. 1 (Respondent's Brief (citing R., p.27).) This assertion is
erroneous - no such language or citation to LC. § 18-8005 appears in the order placing Ms. Marx

1

The Honorable George D. Carey imposed Ms. Marx's original sentence and retained
jurisdiction (R. 46206, pp.355-63), while the Honorable Nancy Baskin entered the order
suspending Ms. Marx's sentence and placing her on probation (R., pp.21-33).
5

on probation. (R., pp.24-33.) Instead, after orally pronouncing that "[a]ll driving privileges are
suspended for five years from your release from custody," the court entered an order placing
Ms. Marx on probation, which clearly and unequivocally states that Ms. Marx's "driver's license
or permit is suspended for a period of five (5) years during which time Defendant will have
absolutely no driving privileges . . . . "

(R., p.27; Tr. 3111/19, p.27, Ls.8-12.)

The State's

argument that the district court did not abuse its discretion is based upon a misunderstanding of
the facts and the law, and is without merit.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Marx respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order imposing a
five-year absolute suspension of her driving privileges, and remand her case to the district court
with instructions that the court impose a license suspension authorized by Idaho law.
DATED this 27 th day of January, 2020.

Isl Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCPleas
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